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Abstract
Leveraging quantum mechanics, cryptogra-
phers have devised provably secure key shar-
ing protocols[4, 3, 6, 17]. Despite proving
the security in theory, real-world application
falls short of the ideal. Last year, crypt-
analysts completed an experiment demon-
strating a successful eavesdropping attack on
commercial quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems[12]. This attack exploits a weakness
in the typical real-world implementation of
quantum cryptosystems. Cryptanalysts have
successfully attacked several protocols[7]. In
this paper, we examine the Kak quantum
cryptography protocol[11] how it may per-
form under such attacks.
1 Introduction
Two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to dis-
cuss some rather sensitive information. They
want to have a private conversation. A third
party, Eve, wishes to listen in on this pri-
vate conversation. Since Eve’s propensity for
eavesdropping is well-known, Alice and Bob
try to design a system that provides secure
communication. Since Eve is the determined
sort, she will search for and exploit any weak-
nesses in the system created by Alice and
Bob. Alice and Bob will eventually discover
their system leaks (Eve is a notorious gossip)
and they will either try to patch it or create
a new system. Escalation ensues, and being
three clever people, increasingly clever meth-
ods are devised for secure communication and
for cracking those systems, or, cryptography
and cryptanalysis, respectively.
So far, the only clever cryptographic
method that cryptanalysts have not cracked
is the one-time pad. The one-time pad cre-
ates a ciphertext using a key at least as long
as the plaintext input and the key is used
only once. If Alice and Bob both possess the
same secret key, Alice can encipher the plain-
text, send the result to Bob, and he can deci-
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pher with his copy of the key. The one-time
pad has been proven perfectly secure[18], but
it suffers from some non-trivial requirements.
Namely, perfectly secure system needs a true
random number generator and a secure way
to distribute the key. Current cryptographic
random number generators remain unproven.
Distributing the key appears to provide the
exact same challenge cryptographers were
trying to address in the first place: sending
a secure message. It turns out that both of
these requirements may be satisfied by lever-
aging quantum mechanics.
2 Quantum Cryptogra-
phy
Approaching the two requirements for a one-
time pad with quantum mechanics returns
promising results. First, using quantum me-
chanics to generate random numbers seems
ideal[2]. In fact, commercial quantum ran-
dom number generators are available[1]. Sec-
ond, one can imagine using quantum me-
chanics to set up a secure short-term com-
munication channel for distributing the key.
One quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
col serves as a foundation for nearly all of the
rest. The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) re-
lies on two principles of quantum mechanics:
1. One cannot take a measurement without
disturbing the system.
2. One cannot clone an unknown quantum
state.
Under this protocol, Alice will send quantum
bits (qubits) to Bob in the form of photons
transmit the key. Should Eve intercept those
photons, she will not be able to “read” the
key without alerting Alice and Bob to her
presence. A closer look at the basics of the
protocol will illustrate how this is true.
This protocol uses polarization encoding.
Photons are prepared in four types of polar-
izations: horizontal, vertical, and two diag-
onals. Figure 1 illustrates these four encod-
ings. Actually, there is another polarization,
circular, but we will come back to that. Say
vertical and −45 ◦ diagonal polarization rep-
resent 0, and horizontal and +45 ◦ diagonal
polarization represent 1. To measure a qubit,
Alice and Bob will use one of two bases. One
base, X, measures diagonally polarized pho-
tons. The other, Z, measures horizontally
and vertically polarized photons. Figure 1
shows how the BB84 protocol works. Now,
that is not to say one cannot measure hori-
zontally polarized photons in the X base. In
fact, measuring with the wrong base reveals
the beauty of this protocol.
Polarization Encoding
0
1
Table 1: Typical configuration for polariza-
tion encoding.
The first principle of quantum mechanics,
mentioned above, says that measuring dis-
turbs the system. This means that the quan-
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Figure 1: a) Basic setup between Alice and Bob. The classical channel is insecure and it is
a non-issue for Eve to eavesdrop on communication over this line. The quantum channel is
where the key is transmitted. b) Alice sends photons polarized in such a way that if they are
measured in its complementing base, it will produce a 1 or (exlusive or) 0 reliably. c) Bob
measures the photons with his random basis, and sends the basis over the classical line to
Alice. d) Alice tells Bob which elements of his basis were compatible with her original signal.
The qubits that Bob measured “correctly” make up the sifted-key.
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tum state collapses to a classical state upon
measurement. For example, if one measures
a horizontally polarized photon in the Z base,
the measurement will return a 1. If one mea-
sures a horizontally polarized photon in the
X base, the measurement will return a 0 or a
1 with equal probability. The quantum state
collapses to either−45 ◦ or +45 ◦ diagonal po-
larization. When measuring in the Z base,
the quantum state still collapses, but it col-
lapses to horizontally polarized every time.
The results are the same for all four of the
polarizations. Therefore, measuring in the
“right base produces one of the two results
(1 or 0) every time, while measuring in the
“wrong base produces one of the two results
with 50% probability. Alice will send a series
of qubits so Bob can measure with a series of
bases, called a basis, and get a string of 1s
and 0s.
How is this useful? If Alice wants to send
a key via photons to Bob, she will have to
tell him, over classical communication lines,
which basis to measure with. Otherwise, 50%
of the 1s and 0s Bob possesses at the end will
not match Alice’s bitstring. If Alice commu-
nicates the basis to Bob over classical lines,
it will be a non-issue for Eve to eavesdrop on
the classical line, intercept the qubits, mea-
sure in Alice’s basis, and generate and send
qubits to Bob with the same polarization as
Alice’s original signal. Eve will have the same
key as Alice and Bob and can eavesdrop on
their private conversation.
Alice does not send her basis, so Bob mea-
sures in a randomly chosen basis. This re-
sults in 50% error in Bob’s key. After Bob
does his measurement, he sends his basis to
Alice. Alice compares her basis his and tells
Bob which elements of his basis match hers.
Alice and Bob both discard the mismatches
in their results, producing a common sifted
key.
Eve cannot perform the same attack she
used when Alice sent the basis measurement
to Bob. Alice’s qubits have come and gone, so
there is no opportunity to measure in Bob’s
basis unless Eve can discover it in advance.
This leaves Eve with no choice but to measure
the qubits in her own random basis. However,
50% of Eve’s basis does not match Alice’s ba-
sis. Eve does not know which elements of her
basis are “wrong, but she must send some-
thing on to Bob or he and Alice will sim-
ply discard the missing qubit bringing Eve
no closer to her goal. The best Eve can do is
send a guess.
If Eve guesses the base to send to Bob,
half of those will be incongruent with Alice’s
original qubits. Alice and Bob will only use
about half of the qubits. Now, half of those
sifted qubits will produce unmatching mea-
surements for Alice and Bob (ie. Eve has
introduced a 25% error rate in the sifted key
between Alice and Bob). The error rate in the
sifted key will alert Alice and Bob to Eve’s
presence, and they can discard the key en-
suring Eve gains no useful information.
Why can Eve not simply copy the qubit
to send to Bob? Then, she could wait un-
til Bob announces his basis and perform the
same measurement. Going back to the sec-
ond featured principle of quantum mechanics
this protocol relies on, one sees that cloning
unknown quantum states is impossible[19].
Since Eve cannot clone the qubit, her only
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option that remains is sending a guess.
Theoretically, this protocol is provably se-
cure. However, the real-world implementa-
tion proves less than ideal. Furthermore,
quantum operations suffer from errors like
classical operations.[8, 9]
3 Faked-state Attack
The BB84 protocol relies on the system’s
ability to send and detect single photons.
Sending single photons at an exact time is
a problem[2], so current systems send a very
weak light signal instead. These signals are
not quite single photons. Likewise, the detec-
tors emulate detecting single photons by pick-
ing up very weak signals. It is this reliance
on weak signals that eavesdroppers will at-
tack. In the faked-state attack, Eve manipu-
lates this weakness in Bob’s detectors to force
him to measure in the same basis as Eve[15].
The faked-state attack exploits a weakness
in the apparatus of QKD systems, namely,
the diode used to detect photons[14, 13]. The
avalanche photodiode (APD) detector is sup-
posed to detect single photons, or at least
approximate the detection of single photons.
However, an APD requires a recharge time
of roughly 1µs before it is ready to detect
another photon. This normally would not
be a problem because under expected use,
weak laser signals would be sent infrequently
enough for the detector to recharge. Makarov
discovered that if you shine continuous light
into the APD, the detector does not recharge
and is reduced to a classical photodiode. Fur-
thermore, by manipulating his continuous
beam of light, he can make the detector click
when he wants or he can blind the detector
from seeing valid input.
Now, the apparatus has four detectors, one
for each polarization. Eve will intercept the
photon from Alice and prepare a faked-state
to send to Bob. They say faked because Eve
is not sending Bob a quantum state, but she
is making Bob’s apparatus think it is detect-
ing a quantum state. Anyway, Eve will in-
tercept Alice’s photon, and she will prepare
her faked state in the opposite base with the
opposite bit she detects. For example, if Eve
detects a 0 in the X base, she will prepare a 1
in the Z base for Bob. Here, she exploits the
detectors. At the same time she sends her
prepared fake state, Eve will blind Bob’s 1-
bit detectors. If he measures in the same base
as Eve, X, he has a 50% chance of detecting
a 0 or nothing at all. If he measures in a
base different than Eve’s, Z, he is guaranteed
to detect nothing at all. Figure 2 illustrates
how this works given Alice’s choice of sending
0 in the X base. Doing this, Eve guarantees
Bob’s apparatus only detects the same bit, in
the same base, she detected.
One might think Bob not detecting 50% of
Alice’s signals would raise concerns, but un-
der normal conditions with today’s technol-
ogy, Bob’s apparatus will only detect a small
portion of the photons sent by Alice. The
blame for this lies with the system’s reliance
on psuedo-qubits, and this reliance is a result
of the protocol’s requirement that the system
send and register single photons. However,
not all QKD protocols have this requirement.
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Alice Eve’s Base Eve’s Measurement Eve Sends Bob’s Base Bob’s Measurement
X0 X 0 Z1 X 0 or no detection
X0 X 0 Z1 Z no detection
X0 Z 0 X1 X no detection
X0 Z 0 X1 Z 0 or no detection
X0 Z 1 X0 X no detection
X0 Z 1 X0 Z 1 or no detection
Table 2: Eve’s faked-stage attack. Note Eve’s measurement in the bottom for has a 50%
chance of detecting a 0 or a 1 since she uses an incompatible base to Alice’s base.
4 Three-Stage Protocol
Imagine Alice wants to send a secret item to
Bob. She puts the item in a box and locks
the box with her padlock. Then, she sends
the box to Bob. When it arrives, Bob puts
his own padlock on the box. Now, the box has
two padlocks on it. Then, he sends it back to
Alice. Alice unlocks her padlock and sends
it back. Upon arrival this time, the box only
has Bob’s padlock on it. He unlocks it and
withdraws the secret item. Assuming these
padlocks are indestructible and can only be
unlocked with their respective owners’ key,
Eve cannot obtain the secret item.
In the three-stage protocol[11], the secret
item is the symmetric key Alice and Bob want
to use for a one-time pad. The padlocks are
transformations[10] applied to the qubits. It
is important that these transformations are
commutative (ie. for transformations U and
V, UV = VU). Alice will perform her trans-
formation (UA) on the qubit and sends it to
Bob. Bob applies his transformation (UB)
and sends it back to Alice. Alice performs
her inverse transformation (UA
−) and sends
it back to Bob. Bob applies his inverse trans-
formation (UB
−) and measures the qubit in
the predetermined base to get the bit. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates this transaction.
Unlike BB84, the three-stage protocol does
not rely on Alice and Bob sending single pho-
tons. The three-stage protocol provides an-
other important advantage. When she at-
tacks communication under the BB84, Eve
knows that the qubits will arrive in one of
two polarization bases. Then, she must only
discern one bit of information. In the three-
stage protcol, qubits can be sent with any
polarization. They are limited only by the
precision of the equipment.
For example, let Alice and Bob use rota-
tion for their transformations. Their systems
perform one of 1024 possible rotations and
the appropriate inverse rotation, respectively.
Eve can easily cut into the line[15] and siphon
off some of the photons in any stage and allow
the rest to continue to their intended destina-
tion. Then, she can send these siphoned pho-
tons through a series of filters to discover the
angle. If Eve can siphon off and discover the
angle at all three stages of the protocol, she
can determine Alice’s and Bob’s transforma-
tions. However, note that to determine the
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Figure 2: a) A qubit is emitted from the source, and Alice’s transformation is applied. The
qubit travels to Bob, where Bob’s transformation is applied. b) The qubit sent back to Alice,
now the result of two transformations. Alice’s inverse transformation is applied canceling
out her initial transformation. c) The qubit is sent to Bob one last time, now with only
his transformation applied. Bob’s inverse transformation is applied, and Bob’s apparatus
measures the qubit.
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angle with 100% certainty, Eve would have
to siphon off at least 1024 photons (assum-
ing she has the technology to split and direct
them to 1024 different filters). If Alice and
Bob send less photons than this threshold,
Eve’s attempt will “use up” the photons, and
she will be detected.
Surely, Bob has to use a detector similar to
the APD to perform the final measurement.
Can Eve manipulate a beam of light to cre-
ate a faked state within Bob’s apparatus such
that she can learn the key? Assume Eve can
create faked states within Bob’s equipment.
She make his equipment register a 1, a 0, or
nothing at all. Eve cannot leverage this in
any way to gain secret information. Notice
that intercepting the signal at any stage, Eve
will possess a transformed qubit. Measuring
the transformed qubit has a 50% chance of co-
inciding with Alice’s original input. She can
force Bob’s apparatus to register the same re-
sult, but the 50% error rate will betray her
eavesdropping.
Eve cannot leverage the faked states attack
on the three-stage protocol, but she can em-
ploy a simpler intercept-resend attack. Since
it is safe to assume that Eve can obtain the
same kind of equipment as Alice and Bob,
she could cut into the line, pose as Bob and
complete a transaction with Alice, and then
pose as Alice and complete a transaction with
Bob. Now, she is privy to any secret commu-
nication over the quantum channel.
One possible solution to this attack is to
apply classical cryptography[5] to ensure the
message’s authenticity. Another solution uses
trusted certificates created using quantum
mechanics[16].
5 Conclusion
Real-world implementations of quantum
cryptography protocols are not as completely
secure as one may hope when looking at the
theory. Simply put, the fault lies with the ap-
paratus. In a more abstract sense, the fault
lies with trying to emulate quantum states.
These emulations are imperfect and attackers
can exploit the imperfections. The Kak pro-
tocol offers advantages, but it is yet to be seen
if it can be implemented for real-world ap-
plications and how it holds up against other
attacks.
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